



**Department of Energy**  
**National Nuclear Security Administration**  
 Washington, DC 20585

July 30, 2003

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 SECURITY DIVISION

The Honorable John T. Conway  
 Chairman  
 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W.  
 Suite 700  
 Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is the quarterly report for Recommendation 98-2 for the period April 1 through June 30, 2003.

During this reporting period, the Department made progress toward completion of 98-2 commitments, and provided the Board a copy of the Pantex site-wide transportation safety analysis report in partial fulfillment of Commitment 4.3.3, "Develop site-wide Technical Safety Requirements controls for on-site transportation of nuclear explosives." Twenty out of twenty-seven commitments have been delivered, and seven remain outstanding.

We plan to brief you in August 2003 on the recovery schedule for accelerated implementation of SS-21 for W88 bay operations, and the path forward for accelerated implementation of SS-21 tooling for W78 nuclear explosive operations.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 202-586-4879, or have your staff contact Debbie Volk at 505-845-5106.

Sincerely,

David E. Beck  
 Assistant Deputy Administrator  
 for Military Application and  
 Stockpile Operations  
 Defense Programs

Enclosure

cc w/enclosure:

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# Quarterly Report for the Implementation Plan

**Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
Recommendation 98-2**

*Accelerating Safety Management Improvements  
at the Pantex Plant*

**April 1 through June 30, 2003**

*Assistant Deputy Administrator  
for Military Operations and Stockpile Operations  
National Nuclear Security Administration  
U.S. Department of Energy*

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## 1.0 Introduction

On September 25, 2000, the Secretary of Energy approved Revision 1 to the 98-2 Implementation Plan (IP) and provided a copy to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board (DNFSB). Change 1, to Revision 1, was provided on October 28, 2002, and was accepted by the Board on December 19, 2002. The following report for the period April 1 through June 30, 2003, tracks progress towards completing the commitments outlined in Revision 1 IP, as modified and expanded through Change 1 to Revision 1.

## 2.0 General Progress

From April 1 through June 30, 2003, the Department delivered the site-wide transportation safety analysis report (SAR) in partial fulfillment of Commitment 4.3.3, "*Develop site-wide controls for on-site transportation of nuclear explosives.*" Progress made on all open commitments is noted in the following sections.

## 3.0 Task Area Status

The status of open and proposed commitments is provided below for each task area of the Revision 1 IP.

### 4.0 Safety Issue Resolution

#### 4.1 Define Scope of Work

There are no outstanding commitments within this task area.

#### 4.2 Analyze Hazards

There are no outstanding commitments within this task area.

#### 4.3 Develop and Implement Controls

**Commitment 4.3.3** - The purpose of this commitment is to address the hazards associated with on-site transportation of nuclear explosives by developing and establishing the technical and analytical basis for site-wide Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) transportation controls.

**Deliverable:** Department of Energy (DOE)-approved Basis for Interim Operations (BIO) module for on-site transportation and associated TSRs and DOE-approved IP for transportation controls.

During this reporting period, Commitment 4.3.3 was partially fulfilled, (reference July 1, 2003 correspondence to the Board, and accompanying classified attachments, for specific accomplishments and activities remaining to achieve completion.)

On July 1, 2003, the Department provided the Board the approved site-wide transportation SAR. The IP needed to complete the commitment is being integrated with IPs for other site-wide authorization basis documents and will be provided by August 30, 2003. This delay will allow for a plan which ensures those controls offering the greatest safety enhancements are implemented early in the process and will provide a more comprehensive basis for monitoring progress in implementing controls of the entire site-wide SAR.

**Commitment 4.3.4** - The purpose of this commitment is to validate implementation of the improved site-wide TSR controls for on-site transportation of nuclear explosives.

**Deliverable:** DOE Readiness Assessment (RA) Report.

The NNSA conducted a RA for the Group 1 controls of the Phase 1 SAR in November 2002. The RA report was forwarded to the Board with an earlier quarterly report in partial fulfillment of the commitment. The specific time line for conducting the final RAs necessary to complete this commitment will be derived after approval of the integrated IP is submitted under Commitment 4.3.3.

#### **4.4 Perform Work**

**Commitment 4.4.4** - The purpose of this commitment is to issue revisions to NV Orders to align with changes to DOE Orders 452.1, 452.2, and DOE-STD-3015.

**Deliverable:** Revisions to supplemental directives 452.1 and 452.2, and Impact Analysis and DOE-approved IP (as required).

On July 15, 2003, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) submitted Revision B to the "*Nevada Test Site Device Assembly Facility Implementation Plan for Technical Safety Requirements.*" The TSR IP is under NSO review. Nuclear explosive safety was incorporated into the DAF Documented Safety Analysis. Therefore, upon approval of the IP, NSO will consider DOE and NV Order 452 implementation complete via the DSA TSRs. The only outstanding piece is to conduct a new Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Master Study with the current one expiring May 2004. As of July 24<sup>th</sup>, LLNL has not responded to this item. The NES Master Study remains unfunded and places DAF at risk of losing NEO authorization after May 2004 assuming no further extensions are authorized. NA-12 and NSO management have indicated they will not support a request for further extension.

**Commitment 4.4.5** - The purpose of this commitment is to authorize startup of the W78 SS-21 process.

**Deliverable:** W78 SS-21 Startup Authorization.

SS-21 extension was approved for January 2004. This includes (with the exception of rebuilds) Disassembly and Inspection, repairs, and testers. The Pantex Site Office partially approved the Hazard Analysis Report on July 18th.

**Commitment 4.4.6** - The purpose of this commitment is to authorize startup of B83 SS-21 process.

**Deliverable:** B83 SS-21 Startup Authorization.

Work is progressing adequately to complete by the scheduled completion of May 30, 2004.

**Commitment 4.4.7** - Accelerated Tooling. Accelerate implementation of critical tooling for two Conventional High Explosive weapons to the greatest extent possible within the scope of the current SS-21 authorization basis projects.

**Deliverable:** Implementation of bay and cell tooling for the W78 program and bay tooling for the W88 program to the Pantex contractor (BWXT).

Decision was made to complete the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) for W88 accelerated bay tooling by August 29, 2003. The W78 accelerated tooling will not be achieved by August 29<sup>th</sup>. Refer to Commitment 4.4.5, above.

**Commitment 4.5.1** – The Department will complete a comprehensive assessment of the actions taken in response to Recommendation 98-2.

**Deliverable:** Final Assessment Report.

The final assessment report is anticipated to be completed as required, provided no unforeseen issues arise that delay closure.